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How might a Green New Deal be applied to the early stage financing of Cleantechs? Amidst 
rising interest and adoption of Green New Deals in the US, the paper explores the need for 
more focused policy to address early stage long horizon financing of Cleantechs. We argue 
that insufficient focus has been applied to early stage investing into these types of innovative 
SMEs that could lower CO2 emissions across a range of sectors (including renewable energy, 
recycling, advanced manufacturing, transport and bio-science). Adopting a resource 
complementarity lens and borrowing from transaction cost theory, we illustrate and build 
theory through longitudinal UK case studies. These demonstrate how government policy can 
scale-up through international collaboration public-private, principally venture capital, co-
finance to facilitate cleantech innovation with potentially game changing impacts on reducing 
CO2 emissions in order to meet the Paris 2015 Climate Change targets. 
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Introduction 
A Green New Deal would represent an unprecedented, massive, mobilisation and deployment of resources to tackle 
the accelerated Climate Change crisis, requiring regions, nations and ultimately global acceptance (The Guardian, 
23/04/2019).  
How might a Green New Deal (GND) be applied to the early stage financing of Cleantechs? Amidst rising interest 
and adoption of Green New Deals in the US and potentially in the UK (NEF, 2019; The Guardian, 2019) and 
declaration of a ‘Climate Emergency’ by the Welsh Government (2019), the paper explores the need for more focused 
policy to address early stage long horizon financing of Cleantechs. 
Over 100 national governments have signed up to the Paris 2015 agreement to work together to form a more 
cohesive approach to tackling Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2019).  The major contributors to CO2 emissions in 
developed countries like the US are energy, heavy industry and transport (81%; EPA, 2018). Therefore, arguably, a 
key issue is to raise investment and overcome current market failures whereby private investors perceive that the 
risks of investment outweigh potential returns and investors are not appropriately remunerated for green investments 
(Lehner, 2016; Owen et al, 2018; Polzin, 2017). Whilst recent efforts have focused on developing Green Investment 
Banks and tackling larger infrastructural renewable energy projects, such as wind farms (Mazzucato & Semieniuk, 
2018), less attention has been given to early stage Cleantech SME investment (Owen et al, 2018). 
The paper focuses on early stage investment in Cleantech, which is broadly defined here as private for-profit 
SMEs which may be pre or early trading that have a mission to develop and adopt innovative technologies to reduce 
CO2 emissions in their products and processes (Kenton, 2018). They typically undertake long horizon research and 
development (R&D) and struggle to obtain sufficient, often high, levels of private investment required to reach 
commercialisation (Owen et al, 2019; BEIS, 2017; Rowlands, 2009).  
Focusing on the example of the UK, post the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), we examine the role of the UK 
Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF) as a leading example of government intervention to address market failure 
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through public-private co-financing to raise the level of early stage venture capital (VC) investment into Cleantechs. 
Adopting a resource complementarity lens we are able to examine the operation of the UKIIF programme to establish 
what works well or less well and address the question as to how a GND approach might be applied, principally to 
venture capital (VC), to improving the under-developed Cleantech early investment market. 
The paper proceeds by examining the role of the UKIIF within the entrepreneurial finance system and the 
emerging UK green finance escalator. We then adopt a complementarity lens to develop propositions which consider 
policymaker, VC financier and innovative early stage cleantech UKIIF investee SME perspectives, focusing on the 
experiences and outcomes of seven longitudinal UKIIF case study SMEs. Our findings lead to three emerging themes 
which, through discussion across the wider evidence base of policymakers, VCs, stakeholders and assisted SMEs, 
contribute to theory and policy by demonstrating a way forward to supporting key disruptive green innovation to 
impact on Climate Change under an overarching Green New Deal type policy initiative. 
Positioning the UKIIF in the VC literature 
The arguments for the importance of private VC in the development of innovation are well established (Gompers et 
al. 2010; Lerner, 2010; Munari & Toschi, 2014; Cumming & Johan, 2016; Baldock, 2016). Private VCs develop 
specialist skills and knowledge to invest in earlier stage innovative ventures and sectors, often preferring to invest 
locally in order to have hands-on contact with the venture management teams. Adopting Markowitz (1952) pareto 
principles they need to invest in sufficient numbers of portfolio ventures and at sufficient scale over time in order to 
obtain returns, which are principally made up of the most successful venture exits (usually through trade sales or 
IPOs). The problem for VC is that early stage investment is risky and the returns are longer horizon, typically taking 
5-7 years and lengthening in times of recession (Owen et al, 2019).  
Early stage Cleantechs may, therefore, be considered particularly vulnerable as they often exhibit long horizon 
intensive R&D with long valley of death periods spanning proof of concept to early commercialisation (Mazzucato 
& Semieniuk, 2018). Additionally, they suffer from a higher Liability of Newness compared to the already known 
issues of traditional new ventures (Lehner & Harrer 2018; Lehner & Nicholls, 2014), which may be because of their 
Cleantech hybrid business-models (Quelin 2017) that aim to combine a commercial logic with an environmental 
mission (Doherty et al, 2014). Since investors are not appropriately rewarded for the full environmental-societal 
value, the risk-reward balance is often viewed as unfavourable (Bocken, 2015; Bak, 2017; Owen et al, 2018). As a 
result, there is an increasing resource-scarcity in these ventures with large funding-gaps (Lehner, 2016; BEIS, 2017). 
Mazzucato and Semieniuk (2018) refer to the well-established role of government to address market failure for 
public good. Furthermore, Lerner (2010) makes a compelling case for public intervention to co-invest with private 
VC to address the early stage funding gaps of innovative ventures. He also raises lessons from past programme 
failures, advocating; sufficient funding scale and appropriate consideration of follow-on funding requirements, long 
fixed-term VC co-finance arrangements (with powers to extend to obtain optimal value portfolio venture exit) with 
recruitment of experienced private fund managers to take the lead in investment decision-making, and the cultivation 
of a suitably supportive financing ecosystem which integrates University  and R&D centres with the finance support 
intermediaries (e.g. accountants and lawyers) and public-private VC programmes. Owen and Mason (2019) take this 
forward with their vision for a mature economy institutional framework for the early stage innovation finance 
escalator, noting the need for an international approach to scale-up VC finance (supported in Baldock, 2016). What 
is missing, is a more focused approach to developing early stage green VC. 
Owen at al. (2019) draw on Lerner’s (2010) and others’ (e.g. Cumming & Johan, 2016; Munari & Toschi, 2014; 
Colombo et al, 2014; Grilli & Murtinu, 2014; Technopolis, 20011) lessons, indicating that the UK is a global leader 
in co-financing with business angels and VCs. They point to the £330m UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF), 
established in 2009, as a leading programme addressing early stage innovation investment – second in size only to 
the more generic £1.2b Enterprise Capital Funds - and the only UK national VC programme with a clear focus on 
low carbon sectors (renewable energy, recycling, advanced manufacturing, digitech and bio-science; see BIS, 2012). 
It is worth noting that the proposed UK £20m Clean Growth Fund announced in 2017 was still to be established in 
Autumn 2019.  
The UKIIF has some ground-breaking features (BIS, 2012). It operates pari passu on an equal footing between 
public and private investors, unlike ECFs which provide an upside incentive to encourage private investment. This is 
to accommodate EU policy, since the programme has £100m of European Investment Fund investment. UKIIF 
operates as a fund of funds, so although it is regulated and monitored by the British Business Bank, it is privately 
operated, with two umbrella funds (UK Future Technologies Fund and Hermes Environmental Impact Fund) 
contracting (unlike the more direct contracting of private VCs operated by the British Business Bank for ECFs) and 
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overseeing the underlying frontline venture investment VC funds. Oxford Research (2015) points to a dearth of 
private VC fund of funds operating in Europe, due to poor track records and high administration costs of having two 
layers of fund management. However, on balance they suggest that public co-finance fund of funds can achieve 
sufficient scale to attract larger private institutional and international co-investment. They conclude that this provides 
the most suitable approach to international scale-up of VC funding and addressing the dual issues of achieving 
sufficient fund size and serving thin markets with insufficient viable business propositions (Nesta, 2009).  
Although beyond the remit of this paper, it should be noted that numerous studies recognise that stimulation of 
demand-side early venture creation is crucial to co-financing VC programme success (see for example Owen & 
Mason, 2019; Cumming & Johan, 2016; Lerner, 2010; Avnimelech & Teubal, 2006; Gilson, 2003) particularly in 
more peripheral, smaller regional/national economies that lack critical mass of entrepreneurial innovation. 
A unique feature of UKIIF is that the underlying funds are international – being based across Europe – and that it 
can invest globally in ventures, provided that at least the £150m UK government programme funding is invested in 
UK-based ventures. In this way UKIIF addresses many of Lerner’s (2010) lessons by being private sector-led, 
contracting with leading international VCs with appropriate track records in early stage and Cleantech sector investing 
and not constrained to thin national/regional markets. Furthermore, as Owen et al (2019) observe, the scale of UKIIF 
underlying funds (at over £60m) is typically more than double that of ECFs, suggesting greater ability to provide 
large long horizon investment and follow-on funding. This addresses one of the key perceived failings of UK and 
European public and private VC, that they are too small when compared to their more successfully established US 
counterparts (Arundale, 2018; Deakins & Freel, 2012; Technopolis, 2011). Indeed, unlike the ECFs it was not 
constrained by EU state aid regulations to an initial £2m. It should be noted that in January 2014 the EU state aid cap 
was raised to £5m. However, many UK funds such as the English Regional Investment Funds subsequently remain 
constrained to a £2m investment cap per venture and 10% of fund cap on investment per venture, typically amounting 
to circa £3m. Furthermore, UKIIF’s fund lifespan is 12-15 years, compared to 10-12 years for ECFs, taking heed of 
the long horizon investment requirements of the Cleantech sectors and enabling a longer period for follow-on funding 
and to achieve optimal portfolio firm exit values.  
Positioning UKIIF within the UK green financing escalator and ecosystem 
It is helpful to use the concept of a green finance escalator (Owen et al, 2018) to position UKIIF within the evolving 
post GFC UK early stage green innovation financing landscape. The finance escalator adapts Berger and Udell’s 
(1998) theory of decreasing opacity of early stage ventures as they develop, suggesting that as venture track record 
develops and information asymmetries between ventures and potential financiers reduce, more and different private 
funding options and larger sums of money become available.  
Table 1 demonstrates that the UK early stage innovative venture market contains a range of public interventions 
– including investor tax breaks, grants and equity funds, to address perceived early stage private equity funding gaps 
(where banks will not lend, North et al, 2013), particularly in the key, high risk valley of death area from proof of 
concept to early trading (up to 2 years). This is the so-called Macmillan gap (1931), currently thought to extend in 
the UK between £250k to £5m (Owen et al, 2019) and which may extend further for long horizon Cleantech R&D 
(BEIS, 2017).  
North et al. (2013) highlight the importance of early stage funding complementarity to meet the financing demands 
of early stage ventures, suggesting that a fluent funding escalator requires effective bundling of different forms of 
finance, whilst Hopp (2010) recognised the value of syndication – notably between VCs (although increasingly 
occurring in recent times between seed VCs, accelerators, equity crowd funders and business angels (Baldock & 
Mason, 2015; Owen et al, 2019) - to raise investment levels, share risks, introduce more diverse investor skills, 
facilitate longer distance equity investment (between some investors and ventures) and open up international markets. 
Hopp (2010) and Baldock and Mason (2015) recognize that VC typically prefers to invest locally for easy hands-on 
access and support to venture teams, but that more distant national and international VC and angel investors will 
invest in syndication with trusted local lead investors who provide the hands-on support.This suggests the increasing 
opportunities for a more international approach to equity investing (Owen & Mason, 2019).  
 
 
 
 
 
R. Owen, O. Lehner, F. Lyon, G. Brennan / ACRN Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives 8 (2019) 163-182 
166 
Table 1. Contemporary UK Green Innovation Finance Escalator for Early and Growth Stages 
Source: Adapted from Nesta (2009a), Mason (2016), Baldock and Mason (2015) and Baldock et al. (2019): * marks public 
sector/government funding intervention, ** where this has some expressed green innovation intent.    
Table 2 demonstrates that whilst the UK has vast sums invested into early stage SME financing in the period of 
study, from 2009, a relatively small proportion has been directed at early stage Cleantechs. Indeed, the programmes 
with direct reference to early stage Cleantechs amount to under £600m, with the majority of this coming from UKIIF. 
To further contextualise the value of UKIIF, British Venture Capital Association (BVCA, 2017) data on members’ 
investment into UK venture stage Cleantechs (which may include co-finance) shows a total of £95m into 151 ventures 
for the period 2014-2016 (representing around 10% of all recorded member venture stage investment in that period). 
Of course, the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2017a) has a £2.5b Clean 
Growth Strategy to support R&D through work with UK research councils, but this is centred around renewable 
energy and much of the financing is aimed at Catapult programmes for offshore and renewable energy solutions, with 
direct finance to SMEs being mainly directed at their energy efficiency. This forms a familiar pattern to that of the 
Green Investment Bank (GIB), which was established by the UK government to lever in private investment for 
infrastructure projects and successfully delivered £2.3b of investment between 2012 and GIB privatisation in 2017, 
but demonstrated little evidence of supporting early stage Cleantechs (Owen et al, 2018). A final addendum here is 
the signs of tensions between the British Business Bank’s sector agnostic (indicated in discussion with British 
Business Bank on 31/05/2019) approach to early stage government VC programmes, as opposed to the more directly 
targeted schemes recently developing through BEIS (such as the proposed Clean Growth Fund) and Innovate UK 
(through programmes like the Investment Accelerator Pilot). 
An important source of early stage Cleantech finance has also been Innovate UK grants, notably Smart awards 
which have traditionally supported proof of concept through to early commercialisation, with grants of up to £250,000 
requiring match funding. However, the evaluation of Smart (SQW, 2015) revealed that only 9% of grant funding 
went to Cleantech, whilst Owen et al (2019) demonstrated that failure to secure match-funding and follow-on funding 
led to a systemic funding for failure. Subsequently, Cleantech has become a priority sector focus through the early 
proof of concept £50m Investment Accelerator Programme (IAP) piloting matching grants and seed VC for low 
Pre-start Start-up to early market 
development 
Early growth and 
development 
Later stage 
Funds: <£50k 
Timescale: 
£50k - £2m+ 
Start to 2 years trading 
£2m – £5m 
2-5 years trading 
£5m - £10m+ 
5-15 years trading 
Internal funding (3Fs) 
Credit cards 
Personal loans 
**‘Proof of concept’ 
grant funding (e.g. 
Innovate UK grants) 
*Incubator support and 
funding (e.g. **CLT) 
*SEIS tax breaks 
Internal funding (3Fs, 
consultancy income) 
Early stage business 
angels/HNWIs 
Business angel syndicates 
Crowd equity 
Accelerator finance 
*Start-up Loans 
**Technology development 
grants (e.g. Innovate UK) 
**Innovation Accelerator 
Programme (IUK) 
**UKIIF 
*Public and seed venture 
capital (VC) including ACF 
*S/EIS tax breaks 
Re-invested profits 
Joint ventures and licensing 
Bank credit (*Loan 
guarantees) 
*Public and private VC 
*Peer-to-peer lending 
**Technology development 
grants 
*Help to Grow (H2G) loan 
guarantees and mezzanine 
*Innovation Loan Pilot (IUK) 
*EIS/VCTs 
Re-invested profits 
Bank credit 
Venture capital 
Potential exit, trade sale, 
MBO/MBI, Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) 
Corporate/institutional 
finance (private equity) 
Business Growth Fund 
(BGF) 
*Business Finance 
Partnership (BFP) funds 
**Green Investment Bank 
(GIB) 
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carbon infrastructure projects of up to £150k and new Smart grants which offer tranches of funding of up to £3m over 
three years.  
Overall, what we see is a proliferation of government public-private co-financing, creating a complex map of 
finance, much of which is not clearly linked with Cleantech objectives, and which is increasingly difficult for 
interested parties to navigate and achieve optimal investment outcomes. 
 
Table 2. Positioning Key Sources of Public SME Green Innovation Finance (marked in green) in the UK, 2009-2019 
Type of finance Funding Description Administering 
Body 
Tax   
R&D Tax Credits SME scheme (<500 employees & £100m sales) for corporate tax rebate or 
cashback 
HMRC 
Seed Enterprise 
Investment 
Scheme 
Start-up (<25 employees) investor tax relief, up to 50%: investor cap £100k, 
firm cap £150k pa 
HMRC 
Enterprise 
Investment 
Scheme (EIS) 
Early stage (<500 employees) tax relief, up to 30%: investor cap £1m, firm cap 
£5m pa  
HMRC 
Venture Capital 
Trusts (VCTs) 
VCs funded through EIS investing in SMEs (<£15m assets) BBB 
Grants   
Innovate UK 
 
 
Various match fund grants: Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (<£80k), SMART 
awards/grants (<£3m), Launchpad and Feasibility (<£400k), Collaboration and 
Catapult (£10m+), including £165m annual funding from 2016 for new forms of 
finance (e.g. repayable loans) 
**Investment Accelerator Programme (£50m) matching grants with seed VCs 
(max £150k) 
UKRI  
Innovate UK 
 
European grants Horizon2020 and Eurostars grants (up to E300k at 50% match-funding)  EU 
Regional Growth 
Fund (RGF) 
Loans and grants through the £2.6bn RGF for English Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) 
BEIS 
Energy 
Entrepreneurs 
Fund  
**£150m Energy Entrepreneurs Fund (EEF) and £10m Energy Innovation Fund BEIS  
Debt/loans   
Enterprise Finance 
Guarantee (EFG) 
75% government guarantee on loans, overdrafts and invoice finance capped at 
£1m 
HMRC 
Business Finance 
Partnership (BFP) 
£100m govt co-invest in invoice, supply chain, asset, mezzanine (growth loans) 
and P2P (e.g. Funding Circle, Zopa) 
BBB 
Green Investment 
Bank (GIB) 
Funding complex projects tackling greenhouse gases, natural resource 
efficiency, natural environment, biodiversity, environmental sustainability. 
£2.3bn invested 2012-2017 including **£2m Green Energy Savings Fund for 
SMEs 
GIB 
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Type of finance Funding Description Administering 
Body 
Big Society 
Capital 
£488.2m invested into charities and social financing organisations by June 2016 Cabinet Office 
VC/equity   
Angel Co-
investment Fund 
(ACF) 
£100m evergreen business angel co-invest fund, from 2011 BBB 
Enterprise Capital 
Funds (ECF) 
£1.2b co-investment VC funds, from 2006  BBB 
UK Innovation 
Investment Fund 
(UKIIF) 
**£330m UK government and European Investment Fund - fund of funds for 
health and Cleantechs, from 2009  
BBB 
Regional Venture 
Capital Funds 
(RVCFs) 
North West (£190m), Yorkshire & Humber (£90m+), North East (£125m), 
**East of England (£20.5m Low Carbon Innovation Fund) - range of loans and 
equity (£2m cap) 
EU 
JEREMIE/ERDF, 
BBB 
UK Government 
Regional 
Investment Funds 
 
From 2016 VC and loan funds: Northern Powerhouse Investment Fund (NPIF) - 
£400m for North West, North East and Yorkshire & Humber; Midlands Engine 
Investment Fund (MEIF) - £250m for Midlands region; Cornwall & Isles of 
Scilly Investment Fund (CoSIF) - £40m 
 
BBB 
 
Devolved UK 
Governments 
 
Scottish (£185m), Northern Ireland (£160m),,Wales (£150m+) VC and loan 
funds (£2m cap) 
 
ERDF/JEREMIE 
SIB/DETI/FW 
 
Universities 
Innovation Fund 
 
£160m (Higher Education Innovation Fund) and University Enterprise Zone 
Pilots (£15m), Knowledge Transfer Networks 
 
Research 
England  
 
Export finance   
UK Export 
Finance 
 
£1.5b scheme 2012-15 to assist export trade credit arrangements 
 
UK Export 
Finance 
Note: ** programme has expressed green innovation support; BBB - British Business Bank; BEIS – Dept for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy; UKRI – UK Research and Innovation; RE – Research England; HMRC - Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs; DETI – Northern Ireland Dept for Enterprise Trade and Industry; ERDF – European Regional Development Funds; 
FW – Finance Wales; JEREMIE - Joint European Resources for Micro to medium Enterprises SIB – Scottish Investment Bank. 
Sources: Adapted from Owen et al (2019)     
Adopting a resource complementarity lens 
The research question addressed in this paper is how a Green New Deal can generate improved external financing 
for early stage innovative Cleantechs. The literature establishes that substantive public-private co-financing with VC 
can address finance gaps for longer-horizon, capital intensive R&D and early commercialisation of Cleantech 
ventures. Taking the case of the UK’s market-leading approach with UKIIF we are able to critically assess what 
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works well, or less well, and to take on board lessons and address the areas for further improvement. To achieve this 
we construct a resource complementarity research framework (Chi and Levitas, 2007). This accounts for the 
interdependencies which occur between innovative (Cleantech) businesses and institutions, within a societal 
framework. From a resource-based perspective the balance between such interdependences is critical in how the value 
of a Cleantech innovation is assessed and supported financially (the purpose of this paper). 
This interdependence – resource-complementarity framework operates on two levels (Table 3): first, the role of 
co-financed VC programmes within the Cleantech strategic policy sphere; second how the co-financed VC process 
can operate better in addressing the financing needs of Cleantechs. The first addresses the need for clearer objectivity 
in policy to target and assist Cleantech (which is evidently lacking from the current UK green finance escalator), 
whilst the second relates to programme operation. We argue that both can benefit from lowering transaction costs to 
improve capital market functionality.  Mindful of tier 1, in this paper we focus on tier 2 and the operation of UKIIF. 
Public-private partnerships (PPP) based on a Green New Deal (GND) can affect the standardisation and 
institutionalisation of the search, contracting and monitoring phases of Cleantech hybrid ventures (Lehner, 2016; 
Lehner and Nicholls, 2014; Lehner, Harrer and Quast, 2018). Standardisation may also be a catalyst for subsequent 
funding from private institutional investors as a successful PPP enhances the legitimacy of both involved parties and 
lowers the transaction costs in order to create a functioning market (ibid). With this we contribute to the ongoing 
research and discussion on hybrid business models and public-private collaborations (Achard and Di Berardino, 
2018). 
 
Table 3. Two-tier Framework for UK Cleantech Policy and Programme Delivery  
Tier one players: the macro policy environment strategy and ecosystem concord 
• Transnational public bodies (EU, World Bank) 
• Government departments (national, regional and local): UK key players BEIS, Government Offices, 
Devolved Governments (NI, Scotland, Wales), Regional/City governments and Mayors (e.g. London 
and Manchester) 
• Specialist economic development and financing / green financing non departmental bodies: British 
Business Bank, Innovate UK,  
• Private financing bodies (financial intermediaries): Green Investment Bank, Carbon Limiting 
Technologies, Carbon Trust 
• Business support and finance intermediaries (private and public sponsored advisory services): Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (38 in England), Local Enterprise Hubs 
Tier Two players: the micro delivery process of policy programmes 
• Government VC co-financing programmes (hybrids): UKIIF, IAP 
• Private financing bodies (financial intermediaries); Banks (Challenger, Regional) VCs Angels 
Private Equity (PE), Crowdfunding (CF), Peer to Peer (P2P), Asset finance 
• Business support and finance intermediaries (private and public sponsored advisory services): 
Accountants 
• R&D centres/universities: Catapult Centres, University R&D commercial spin-out centres (e.g. 
Maxwell Centre, Cambridge University) 
• Cleantech early stage Ventures: ventures trading less than 2 years undertaking R&D to reduce CO2 
emissions 
Focusing on a resource complementary lens and drawing on the literature of hybrid VC (Murray, 2007; Lerner, 
2010; Munari & Toschi, 2014; Cumming & Johan, 2016; Owen et al, 2019 etc.) we are able to construct a series of 
propositions for the different types of resources that will most prominently benefit from this type of public – private 
partnership (PPP) which transacts between government, Private VC and entrepreneur/venture. Whilst table 4 is by no 
means exhaustive, it nevertheless presents key elements derived from leading, current literature where we can propose 
that PPP will enhance operation and delivery of: 
 
(1) P1 - Funding: improved early stage funding escalator and availability of early stage VC 
(2) P2- Management: Enhanced VC management, investment decision-making and Entrepreneurial/venture team 
 management 
(3) P3 – Risk-sharing: enhanced risk sharing environment will benefit VC investors and ventures 
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(4) P4 – Networking: enhanced networking will assist viable venture pipeline and increased VC and complementary 
 investment including through syndication 
(5) P5 – Skills Development: will lead to improved VC investment and venture performance 
(6) P6 – Cleantech innovation / economic growth: enhanced cleantech innovation and economic growth through 
 adequate and effective VC financing market. 
 
Table 4. Resource Complementarity Framework for UKIIF 
Government Private VC Entrepreneur 
1.Funding 
Substantial government funds, 
accountable to HMT, provide 
value for money, effective flowing 
finance escalator (Baldock, 2016) 
Insufficient funds and appetite in 
early stage investing, increased 
scale can increase institutional 
investment (Technopolis, 2011)  
Asymmetric barriers to early stage 
risk finance (Carpenter & 
Petersen, 2002) 
2.Management 
Government bureaucrats lack 
skills to invest directly in early 
stage ventures (Lerner, 2002) 
Skills, experience to address 
agency failures (Lerner, 2010; 
Gompers et al, 2009) 
Commercial and financial 
management skills (Baldock & 
Mason, 2015) 
3.Risk sharing 
Improved likelihood of returns 
investing with private VC track 
record and scale-up (Lerner, 2010) 
Government funding safety net, 
increases funding scale and 
likelihood of pareto return 
(Markowitz, 1952); VC 
syndication linkages (Hopp, 2010) 
Cede share of ownership, but 
obtains certification of VC 
finance, increasing likelihood of 
further follow-on finance 
(Cumming & Johan, 2016) 
4.Networking 
Government policies promote 
entrepreneurial ecosystem 
networks for SME growth 
/sustainability (Brown & Mason, 
2014 & 2017) 
Need pipeline of viable ventures 
(Mason & Brown, 2013). Provide 
access to complementary finance, 
skills and commercial markets 
(Owen et al, 2019) 
Require access to management 
skills/training, supply chain, 
commercial markets (Owen et al, 
2019a) 
5. Skills Development 
Skills development increases 
productivity and competitiveness 
(Gambin et al, 2009) and virtuous 
cycle of development (Lerner, 
2010) 
Early stage VC skills and sector 
specialisms development 
(Gompers et al, 2009) and 
recycling of new VC manager 
talent (Lerner, 2010) 
Management team development 
through recruitment, training, 
mentoring and oversight (Baldock, 
2016; Munari & Toschi, 2014) 
6. Cleantech Innovation / economic growth 
Policy promotes cleantech 
innovation for Climate Change 
(Owen et al, 2018), raising GDP 
through vibrant SME jobs, sales, 
export growth (Lerner, 2010)  
VC seek early stage innovation 
with risk/reward potential for 
financial return (Burchardt et al, 
2016), create venture growth, 
scale-up (Baldock, 2016) 
Create innovative disruptive 
cleantech R&D start-ups (Owen et 
al, 2019), creating jobs, sales and 
competitive exporting SMEs 
(Owen et al, 2019) 
Table 4 clearly demonstrates the overall key to addressing Climate Change in the interdependency of the three 
main actors studied. Government policy framework can fund and support early stage Cleantech, whilst early stage 
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VC can reduce agency failures (moral hazards and adverse selection) using key skills to select and nurture portfolio 
ventures, with the ventures developing game changing disruptive green innovations to lower carbon emissions. 
Methodology 
We adopt a mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2003) in order to triangulate primary evidence drawn from in-depth 
longitudinal case studies of seven UKIIF assisted Cleantechs (in renewable energy, recycling and advanced 
manufacturing) with other relevant contextual sources in the 2010-15 period (Tables 5 and 6).   
 
Table 5. Breakdown of business interviews 2010-2015 
UK GVC Fund recipients/study F/F, or extended 
telephone interview 
Interview dates Longitudinal follow-up 
interviews, Summer 2015 
Innovative SME journey 30 Feb 2015 - 
ECF (Enterprise Capital Funds) 12  Feb 2010 & Feb 2014 7 
ACF (Angel Co-investment fund) 15 Feb 2014 - 
UKIIF (UK Innovation 
Investment Fund) 
16 Feb 2012 & May 2013               14 - including 7 Cleantech 
case studies 
Technology Based Small Firms 
(TBSFs) 
49 Feb 2011 1 
Aspire 4 Feb 2010 & May 2013 2 
EGF (Early Growth Fund) 9 Feb 2010 - 
Total 133 (2010-15) 24 
Source: interviews undertaken by CATI (computer assisted telephone interviews), F/F on business premises or by extended 
telephone interview 
In total the CEOs of 133 young potential high growth and innovative UK ventures were surveyed either face-to-
face, or by extended telephone interview by the authors. This includes six UK early stage venture investment 
programmes overseen by the British Business Bank and two studies (technology based small firms, North et al, 2013; 
innovative firm’s journey to finance, BEIS, 2017) specifically examining early stage innovative venture finance. 
Ventures were purposively selected in order to provide insight into a range of different early stage sectors, including 
Cleantech. Overall, they are characterised as follows; ventures are typically under 2 years established and pre-trading 
when first interviewed, micro-businesses with less than 10 employees and undertaking innovative market leading 
R&D in science, engineering and advanced manufacturing, or digitech service sectors (e.g. App and Fintech). One 
quarter of the base sample and 63% of the longitudinal sample are Cleantech, represented by renewable energy (e.g. 
solar PV, biomass), digitech (e.g. smart energy metres), recycling (e.g. water, rubber/plastics and aluminium) and 
advanced engineering (e.g. digital efficiency controls, robotics, electric vehicles, lightweight plastics and battery 
storage solutions).  
All data was systematically collected by the authors using integrated interviews (Owen et al, 2019), typically taking 
1.5 hours, covering business profile, nature and stage of innovation, external financing requirements, finance search 
times and costs, and extent of impact of VC/equity finance and non-financial assistance on subsequent business 
performance, including follow-on financing and investment exit information. The seven Cleantech case studies were 
selected as exemplar cases of UKIIF assistance (and exclude health sector cases, which represented around half of 
UKIIF’s early stage investments) and longitudinally tracked through 3 surveys between 2012-15, with supporting 
information coming from VC investors, programme management data and company websites.   
Additional triangulatory qualitative contextual data was provided by 58 semi-structured telephone and face-to-face 
interviews with investors (business angels and VC fund managers), intermediaries and industry experts (Table 6, see 
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Owen et al, 2019a; Baldock, 2016; Baldock and Mason, 2015; Baldock and North, 2015), with particular 
consideration given to the Cleantech UK early stage government co-financing market, post GFC.  
 
Table 6. Breakdown of fund manager and investor interviews 
Fund Location/ time of interview 
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs): 
The Catapult Growth Fund (ECF) 
IQ Capital Fund 
Oxford Technology 
Seraphim Capital Fund 
Sustainable Technology Partnership 
Amadeus and Angels Seed Fund 
Dawn 
MMC 
 
Spring 2014 
Leicester 
Cambridge 
Oxford 
London 
London 
Cambridge 
London 
London 
UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF): 
Hermes GPE Environmental Innovation Fund  
European Investment Fund UK Future Technologies Funds 
Underlying funds: 
Zouk Cleantech II 
Scottish Equity Partners (SEP) Environmental Energies 
WHEB Ventures 
DFJ Esprit 
Advent Life Sciences 
Gilde Healthcare III 
Spring 2012 
Fund of funds manager, London 
Fund of funds manager, Luxembourg 
 
Hermes fund, London 
Hermes fund, Glasgow and London 
Hermes fund, London 
EIF UKFTF fund, London and Cambridge 
EIF UKFTF fund, London 
EIF UKFTF fund, Utrecht and Cambridge USA 
 
Angel Co-Investment Fund (ACF): 
19 Lead business angel investors from investment syndicates, of 
which 16 were successful ACF applicants and were unsuccessful 
3 Investment Committee (IC) members - experienced angel or 
institutional investors 
 
Spring 2014 
10 angel groups, 5 in London, 2 in South East, 1 East 
Midlands, 1 in South West England and 1 in Scotland 
UK-wide representation 
Alternative Investors and Experts 
13 alternative private investors: Private VCs (4) and seed VCs (3), 
Venture Capital Trusts (3) Angel Capital Groups (3) 
6 industry stakeholders and experts: British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA), UK Business Angels Association 
(UKBAA), Angel News, St John’s Innovation Centre, European 
Investment Fund (EIF), Professor Dylan Jones-Evans (Finance 
Wales reviewer) 
Spring 2010 to Spring 2014 
8 in London, 1 North East, 1 Yorkshire and Humber, 
1 Scotland 
 
UK-wide coverage 
 
Source: CEEDR studies 2010-2015 
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Data collected provides a rich source of qualitative information on the financing requirements of early stage 
Cleantechs and the extent to which public-private co-financing programmes are meeting these needs. The data gave 
rise to the possibility to consider a-posteriori how a GND could establish a more systematic and institutionalised 
approach to assisting Cleantech early stage investing, leading to lower corresponding transaction costs through the 
standardizing of the search, contracting and monitoring phases (Lubell et al, 2017).  
In addition, we apply a resource-complementarity lens to understand how a public-private collaboration (Shi et 
al, 2016) based on a GND can result in effective, optimized value-creating solutions towards the climate goals that 
far out-weigh the involved costs (De Schepper et al, 2015). In this, we understand resource-complementarity lens 
(Sayeed & Onetti, 2018; Soda & Furlotti, 2017) as the degree to which the joint use of distinct sets of resources (e.g. 
the innovative mindset and skills and the financing power) produces a higher total return than the sum of returns that 
could be achieved if the resources were only utilized independently.  
Findings 
Adopting our resource complementarity framework (6 propositions), we present findings from the 7 case studies’ 
perspectives to examine how in practice the UKIIF has addressed their Cleantech early stage financing requirements. 
We take into account transaction cost and impact measures to assess what has worked well or less well, before 
proceeding to a discussion on the implications for policy. Analysis of the research propositions revealed considerable 
interrelationships between the propositions and is presented here under four emerging major themes, of which theme 
2 (search times, negotiations and costs), may be considered a subset of the first funding theme (notably in addressing 
proposition 1).   
Funding, bundling and risk-sharing (P1, P3) 
Early stage Cleantechs require substantial amounts of external financing. Table 7 demonstrates that the 7 case study 
ventures were seeking either first round, or early round finance for R&D and early commercialisation. They were all 
independent micro businesses and pre-trading at the time of their search for external finance. The size of the funding 
rounds to which UKIIF contributed ranged from £300k to £13m, but were typically over £1m (median £2.1m). UKIIF 
typically provided at least half of the funding round (median £2m), frequently syndicating with other VCs and notably 
bundling with other funding providers to generate larger rounds (Baldock & Mason, 2015), providing evidence of 
syndication with overseas VCs to share early stage investment risk (Hopp, 2010), scale-up investment (Baldock, 
2016) and facilitate access to international markets (Owen et al, 2019). Case D’s CEO commented “SEP brought in 
a US VC at the commercialisation stage to introduce us to the US market.”  
It is worth reflecting that the scale and size of funding for these UKIIF cases is considerably higher than for 
comparable, but more generic UK ECF funds (median £750k ECF investment), with considerably more syndication 
taking place to achieve the financing round requirements (Owen et al, 2019). Crucially, UKIIF was a lever to other 
private investment with one CEO mentioning that “the UKIIF SEP fund encouraged Zouk’s later stage VC fund to 
invest £3m earlier in the business than otherwise possible.” The high share requirements of the UKIIF VCs is 
indicative of the high risk and early stage investments taking place (median 25%), with follow-on funding in case D 
leading to a 75% share. Notably, none of the interviewed CEOs complained about the proportion of ownership share 
taken by UKIIF VCs, supporting Gompers et al (2010, 2009) proposition that experienced early stage VCs offer both 
vital finance and also the required non-financial sector, management and networking skills. The evidence here 
strongly supports the propositions that government can co-fund with private VCs to leverage increased volume of 
early stage private sector equity funding (Lerner, 2010; Owen et al, 2019). Furthermore, this is interlinked with 
encouragement of VC syndication, notably through UKIIF’s fund of funds model (Owen et al, 2019), which 
demonstrates the value of risk sharing in generating increased funding (Hopp, 2010).    
Search times, negotiations and costs (P1, P4) 
Government VC programme assessments often focus on additionality and leverage, without sufficiently considering 
transaction costs (Baldock, 2016; BEIS, 2017; Owen at al, 2019). Most of the 7 case studies experienced relatively 
short search times of under 3 months. This was mainly serendipitous, highlighting the timeliness of UKIIF and 
existing VC connections and the excellent fit of the programme to the ventures’ funding requirements. The UKIIF 
funds were described by CEOs as “the fund of choice” and “the most experienced and proven fund” in the sector. 
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This might suggest that the level of UKIIF additionality is low (Owen et al, 2019, indicate that it is lower than for 
ECFs), since the funds were selected quickly and sometimes over other competing private VC funds. However, this 
narrow view overlooks important contributary factors. First, the CEOs perceive that selecting the most suitable and 
experienced fund, and fund managers to work with, is more important than lower cost/share options and second that 
the speed and scale of access afforded by UKIIF in most cases led to more rapid R&D and commercialisation and 
increased the scale of activity. Additionally, from the fund managers’ perspectives, UKIIF was reported as facilitating 
more rapid and larger-scale fund closes (reported by the BBB and fund managers as particularly helpful in the 
aftermath of the GFC), suggesting that the case study investment – particularly in terms of their early stage and large 
size of investments would not have been available without the government programme. This is underlined by the 
more severe experiences of the cases where funding was required before UKIIF was established and highlighted by 
case E.     
 
Case E: Three-year round 1 funding search (2008-2010) 
Seeking a package of equity and bank finance to fund a management buy-in to an existing UK-based business and 
undertake internal R&D to commercialise ‘PET’ lightweight plastics technology. Total project cost was £13m, of 
which UKIIF provided £2.6m for a 21% equity share. The funding search process took three years, hampered by lack 
of bank and early stage equity finance available in the UK and Europe. UKIIF was found using an accountant VC 
finder, and was not problematic, but took nine months to negotiate.  
 
“Getting a UKIIF VC on board as lead investor was a catalyst to getting further VC investment and European bank 
finance… critical to business development, transforming a business that was closing down into a global market 
leader.”    
The negotiation time to undertake due diligence and agree terms and conditions was typically around 3 months, 
but could take up to nine months for more complex transactions such as case E which required a syndication bundle 
of additional bank and VC finance to undertake a manufacturing factory buy-in, or case A, described by the CEO as 
“involving complex IP rights for a spin-out from Cambridge Innovation.”  
Transaction costs for VC are high, typically amounting to 5% of ECF deals (BIS, 2010) and often an even higher 
proportion of smaller value deals. These can involve the search costs for accountant and VC finder services and direct 
costs for consultancy and accounting services to undertake due diligence and legal fees for negotiating and agreeing 
contractual terms and conditions, with applicants frequently responsible for both parties’ legal costs or VC 
administration fees. Additionally, there is the management search time and opportunity costs associated with lengthy 
searches and compliance work for applications which take time out from other core business development activities 
(BEIS, 2017); which could typically require a day or two a week of senior management time for several months (BIS, 
2010). Despite the high costs of obtaining VC, none of the UKIIF case CEOs complained. They stated that costs were 
at the expected market rate, which was particularly acceptable if search times were reduced and for case F which used 
UKIIF syndicated with the Scottish Co-investment Fund (SCIF), it was “…less expensive because it saved on the 
time and cost of finding and agreeing investment terms with individual angels.”      
Overall, there is strong evidence to support proposition 1 that government co-finance programmes can increase 
the supply of early stage finance (Lerner, 2010). There is also support for proposition 4 with increased VC networking 
capacity being catalysed by a government backed fund of funds allied to VC syndication (Hopp, 2010). This can 
generate sufficiently large early stage funding rounds and capacity to follow-on fund, reducing search times and costs 
for initial and succeeding rounds. 
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Table 7. Case Study Funding Requirements and Search Details 
Company/ 
Established 
UKIIF 
Fund 
Activity/green Round/ 
amount 
UKIIF/ 
share 
Leverage Search 
Time 
Time 
Neg 
A (2010) DFJ 3D Radar, 
windfarms near 
airports 
1: £2.1m £1.6m (50%) 0% <3 months 6-9 
months 
B (2010) Zouk/ 
SEP 
Energy, smart 
metres, battery R&D 
1: £6m £3m (50%) 50% <3 months <3 
months 
C (2009) SEP Renewable grid 
connection 
1: £1m £0.5m (24%) 50% <3 months <3 
months 
D (2005) SEP Domestic water 
recycling 
3: £2m   £2m 
(25%/75%) 
0% <3 months <3 
months 
E (2009) WHEB Lighter PET plastic 1: £13m £2.6m (21%) 500% 3 years 9 months 
F (2010) SEP Drones energy 
inspection 
1: £300k £150k (25%) 25% 
(SCIF) 
1 year <3 
months 
G (2009) WHEB Domestic Smart 
energy controls 
1: £6.5m £3m (27%) 0% <3 months 5 months 
Management, networking and skills development (P2, P4, P5) 
Early stage VC perform a vital role in nurturing their portfolio business development. This helps to overcome agency 
problems, particularly moral hazard where early stage venture management deficiencies can lead to sub-par 
performance (Baldock and Mason, 2015). It was widely evidenced by the case studies (via CEOs and UKIIF fund 
managers) that VC were in regular, at least monthly, contact, acted as board advisors, appointed non-executive 
directors and recruited specialist managers to strengthen the management team, notably financial and commercial 
directors.  
A distinction was made here between technical development, which is typically the domain of the founding 
venture team and which VCs are usually less able to assist and broader commercial marketing expertise. Several 
interviewed CEOs mentioned the importance of commercial rigour, developing tight financial management controls 
and regular monthly reporting, and this was an important contributory factor in all of the CEOs feeling more confident 
about raising follow-on finance. These processes established various positive outcomes. For example, case A 
recruited a Chief Finance Officer, whilst for case E the VC was “..massively helpful, providing a strong steer on 
corporate finance and governance and constructive input at all times. They have been particularly helpful in finding 
new overseas customers.”  It is notable that this company now has board representatives from Russia and South Asia 
which have proved huge growth markets in recent years.   
Another aspect of skills development, unrecognised in some studies, is early stage fund management. Whilst some 
funds like DFJ (Draper Esprit) have considerable track records in early stage finance, others such as Zouk have been 
encouraged to enter earlier stage venture financing, learning by operating with shared syndication risk. Lerner (2010) 
recognised the value of this process (e.g. Israel’s Yozma funds and New Zealand’s Venture Investment Fund) 
whereby experienced fund managers demonstration affects can encourage others into the market, but also upskill 
other local fund managers (Baldock, 2016).  
Here there is clear evidence of upskilling for VCs and entrepreneurial management teams, particularly in support 
for proposition 2. VC fund managers particularly benefit from the oversight network of UKIIF’s fund of funds 
management structure that can offer early investing skills support (Oxford Research, 2015) and wider VC syndication 
opportunities to enhance investor skills and share risk (further supporting proposition 4; Hopp, 2010). Furthermore, 
proposition 2 is supported by the evidence of entrepreneurial management skills improvement delivered by VCs’ 
advice and management recruitment practices (Owen et al, 2019), although it is noted that this is largely focused on 
financial management and marketing, rather than R&D and technical support.   
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Cleantech economic impacts and global Climate Change game changers (P6) 
Since receiving early stage Cleantech funding from UKIIF the 7 case study ventures have performed well. 
Collectively, they have generated over 840 FTE jobs since receiving UKIIF investment and moved from pre-trading 
R&D through to commercialisation and in 2018 £106.7m sales (median £6m). Their impacts on reducing CO2 
emissions have also been considerable. Whilst it is worth noting that there is no consistent measurement in place for 
these businesses, they demonstrate enormous energy savings through the operations of smart energy controls (e.g. 
case G’s 23% savings on domestic energy use, and case B’s smart controls for business and high end domestic users), 
windfarm development and maintenance (cases  A, B and F) and advanced ‘PET’ lightweight and fully recyclable 
plastics which have transformed the drinks/liquid foods distribution industry, reducing plastic container materials by 
90%, reducing container weight by 85% and eliminating empty container return costs through 100% recycling 
technology. Cases A and F are intriguing examples of Cleantech whose impacts are more difficult to quantify. Case 
A’s holographic 3D radar should enable highly efficient large-scale wind turbines to be located on and nearby 
defence/military sector land and close to airports without affecting flight control (unlike conventional radar systems); 
it is undergoing trials with the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 2018-19. Case F’s inspection drones have been 
used for conventional oil and gas industry rig inspection and for renewable energy windfarms.  
All UKIIF cases reached commercialisation and have delivered cleantech products and services, although case 
D’s domestic grey water recycling product failed to gain a market foothold in 2013-14 and the company subsequently 
closed. The remaining 6 cases have all successfully exited UKIIF within a nine year period, producing substantial 
returns to the UKIIF underlying funds and the UK tax payer. Exits have included a trade sale and an IPO which raised 
US$20m for case G in 2014. The majority of cases have refinanced and exited UKIIF, through Private Equity (PE) 
and joint venture arrangements and, for case C, through debt refinancing in 2015. It is notable that these businesses 
are highly innovative market leaders that service global markets. For example, case G has trialled smartphone controls 
on domestic energy use in Denmark and New Zealand, whilst case E’s joint venture provided access to the vast Indian 
sub-continent market, with the company also very active across Eastern Europe, Russia and North America. Crucially, 
the surviving businesses retain considerable UK presence, notably R&D activity, and with several former CEOs 
involved in investing in and managing new Cleantech start-ups, thus supporting Lerner’s (2010) and Owen and 
Masons’ (2019) belief in the local recycling impact of public VC (an important bi-product of proposition 5).     
 
Table 8. Case Study Status, June, 2019 
Co. Jobs 
Created 
Annual 
Sales  
UKIIF Status/Exit year Green Impacts / Mega Watt (MW) 
estimations 
A 50 £10m Acquired, 2017 Enabling giant wind power on MoD land, 
tests from late 2018  
B 480 £75m Private Equity, 2014 480MW renewable generation; 380MW 
battery storage by 2020 
C 125 £6m Debt refinance, 2015 250MW in Grid Renewables Input 
D 0 (10*) 0 launched domestic grey water 
recycling in 2013   
Grey water recycling product marketed, but 
failed in 2014 
E 75 6m Joint venture buyout, 2014 PET containers reduce 90% weight, 85% 
material, 100% recyclable 
F 60 3.9m Private Equity, 2019  Drone inspection of windfarms 
G 50 5.8m Raised $20m in IPO 2014 Smartphone control of domestic heating with 
23% energy saving 
Total 840 £106.7m 6 Exits, 1 closure All made impacts, 6 ongoing 
Note: * 10 staff at time of closure 
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Case B has focused on the UK market and, whilst becoming a global top 100 Cleantech, it has created nearly 500 
FTE jobs in the UK and generated annual sales turnover of over £75m in the decade since start-up. This case provides 
a compelling example of how UK government VC funds can assist hugely impactful Cleantech outliers.  
 
Case B: A Global 100 Cleantech Growth company 
The first UK company offering total energy solutions, following North American and German models, focusing 
on the larger commercial business market, provide consultancy and advice on a full range of renewable energies. 
Established 2010 with UKIIF providing 50% of start-up capital, the company offers initial concept, R&D, 
monitoring, financing and all technical solutions and have patented their own energy monitoring devices, 
developed in-house through strategic company acquisition and key staff recruitment.  
 
Key Green Impacts 
 
The company’s products and services over the last decade have reduced UK carbon emissions by an estimated 
480MW (2017) of renewable energy generated through solar and wind. The company’s dual strategy of short-
term digitech smart control and energy consultancy and long-term battery storage R&D enabled rapid Global 
100 scale Cleantech sales growth and early exit from UKIIF via scale-up PE investment in 2014. A recent deal 
with a major utility company has put them at the forefront of battery storage and on track to meet 380MW by 
2020. 
 
“As the UK market leader in energy storage, we command the industry’s most accurate revenue modelling tool 
and are on track to exceed 380MW of battery storage by 2020. We have constructed over 100 solar farms, and 
our O&M service, ‘XYZMeter’, monitors over 21,500 sites. We were first in the UK to achieve subsidy-free 
solar, first to introduce utility-scale energy storage, and first to co-locate energy storage with existing solar 
sites. To date [March, 2019], our technologies deployed and managed are generating over 1GW of renewable 
energy.”  
UKIIF additionality 
Whilst the CEO acknowledges other VC funding was available, UKIIF’s fund was their first choice: “I trusted 
them as a leading VC in the cleantech field. The fund manager knows and understands the sector and provides 
an excellent sounding board for day to day management decisions. Their industry connections and commercial 
rigour helped prepare the company for scale-up PE and built the platform for our later growth.” 
 
In summary proposition 6 is very strongly supported by the longitudinal evidence from the case studies. Whilst it 
is too early to comment on whether a sustainable early stage cleantech VC market has been created, as this could 
potentially take decades to establish (Lerner, 2010, Baldock, 2016), there is evidence of green economic impact and 
of successful investment exits which will enable fund recycling. Crucially, this offers the opportunities for a growing 
cleantech early financing ecosystem with increasingly experienced early stage VC fund managers and serial 
entrepreneurs (Owen and Mason, 2019).  
Discussion  
Summarising the findings through a complementarity lens, all of the hypothesised benefits have accrued to some 
extent, but the findings also reveal important lessons for future programmes, particularly around evaluating green 
impacts (Owen et al, 2018) and the potential benefits of paying greater attention to transaction costs.   
Table 9 presents a synthesis of key transaction cost factors where complementarity between government policy 
and programmes, private VC and cleantech entrepreneurs has led to demonstrable benefits for all parties. This 
synthesis is formed from our complementarity framework findings for the 6 propositions. The findings demonstrated 
considerable interrelationships between the 6 propositions and the emergence of three key themes which can inform 
theory, policy and practice. 
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Funding, bunding and risk sharing (propositions 1, 3 and 4) 
Funding, bunding and risk sharing (including propositions 1, 3 and 4) are all enhanced by UKIIF with key reductions 
in transaction costs for government relating to lighter touch oversight management required by the British Business 
Bank (e.g. compared to in-house management of their Angel Co-investment Fund), whilst the increased scale of 
activity of the UKIIF fund of funds enables direct investment from institutional pension funds (£80m was raised from 
two pension funds) and the oversight of an experienced Cleantech specialist fund with knowledge of over 60 VC 
funds: 
“Hermes contributes … by referencing providers (i.e. underlying funds) and introducing new investors to funds that 
Hermes are working on for investments.  Also advising these funds on how to improve due diligence materials.” 
Hermes fund of funds manager. 
The scale-up of activity possible through a fund of funds mechanism and flexibility of funding with potential top-
up funding to underlying funds provides greater opportunity to reach Markowitz (1952) portfolio investments 
numbers and to follow-on fund to generate optimal exit value. Furthermore, operation across international boundaries 
through international fund linkages across Europe and US reduces the adverse selection risk of thin markets (Nesta, 
2009). For the cleantech entrepreneurs the search time savings and single deal structure of UKIIF investments 
potentially saves costs – particularly in relation to follow-on funding which is critical to the generation of smooth 
flowing green innovation funding escalator (North et al, 2013; Baldock, 2016). However, there is always room for 
improvement on due diligence and legal negotiation fees, which can be off-putting to some ventures (Baldock and 
North, 2015), although this was not evident amongst the UKIIF cases studies here. Here a critical issue still lies with 
the selection of Cleantech innovation, which ideally requires knowledge and application of circular economy 
assessment measures and tools (Owen et al, 2018). 
Management, networking and skills (propositions 2,4 and 5) 
Management, networking and skills (incorporating propositions 2, 4 and 5) are all enhanced by UKIIF. Contracting 
the management of the UKIIF to highly experienced private VC umbrella fund managers, with light touch oversight 
required by the British Business Bank, enables government to focus greater attention on the wider policies (which 
should be associated with GND policy strategy) necessary to generate the pipeline of early stage Cleantechs and 
deliver the support services to facilitate VC take-up. One aspect is the promotion of programmes to equity finance 
trade bodies such as the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and UK Business Angels Association 
(UKBAA) and intermediary advisory services such as accountants through the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW). As Baldock and North (2015) suggest, more could be done to promote programmes, 
particularly in more remote UK regions from London. This has only recently been recognised through the increased 
regional presence of British Business Bank staff (since 2017) to assist the promotion and delivery of the English 
Regional Investment Funds. The additional umbrella tier of private VC creates additional management costs, but 
these are potentially off-set by the superior investment performance and quality of oversight provided by leading 
early stage Cleantech fund managers. As the Hermes fund manager suggested, they can diffuse skills downline to the 
underlying funds, contributing to Lerner’s (2010) concepts of upskilling of VC fund managers. They also generate 
between the funds a considerable global network, increasing opportunities for syndication, further investment and 
international market entry. Cleantech entrepreneurs are shown to benefit considerably from the superior finance, 
market and network knowledge of top tier VCs – reducing search times and transaction costs in these matters. 
However, a potential deficiency here is that VCs appear to be more focused on financial management and marketing 
skills development, whilst other studies demonstrate that technical and regulatory issues are major hurdles for 
cleantech innovations (Owen et al, 2019a).  
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Table 9. Positive Impacts on Transaction Costs Development Framework for Cleantech Financing 
Government Private VC Cleantech Entrepreneur 
1.Funding, Bundling and Risk Sharing (propositions 1, 3 and 4) 
Government funds encourage earlier 
stage, scaled-up private VC, shared 
risk, increased investments and greater 
likelihood of returns 
Government promotes funds, working 
with business support and private 
finance trade bodies 
Larger VC funds more attractive to 
institutional investors, leverages more 
private funding 
VC networks increased syndication, 
sharing risks, increasing investment, 
opening up international markets (e.g. 
through international syndication) 
Increased early investment facilitates 
faster R&D, follow-on funds and 
commercialisation 
Reduced search times/costs, 
competitive set-up fees less than 
fragmented (angel) investment costs 
2.Management, Networking and Skills (propositions 2, 4 and 5) 
Government pays VC to manage funds, 
minimises government administrative 
costs of BBB 
Complementary policies promote 
entrepreneurial pipeline, 
entrepreneurial support infrastructure 
Fund of Funds extra tier of costs, 
gaining expert fund selection, fund 
management and private financial 
leverage 
VCs network/syndicate to enhance 
their fund manager and portfolio 
management skills 
Expert fund managers deliver 
commercial rigour and acumen in the 
boardroom, recruit and appoint key 
NEDs, managers, assist with market 
development and prepare and find 
further private finance, easing flow of 
finance escalator. 
3. Cleantech Innovation, Climate Change Mitigation and Economic Growth (proposition 6) 
Policies support early stage Cleantech 
to lower CO2, creating sustainable 
green economy and global impacts 
Optimal firm exists along with jobs, 
sales, multipliers, international trade 
provide tax revenues and ‘green kudos’   
Specialist VC funds select most viable 
Cleantechs, financing and managing 
their commercialisation and scale-up. 
Successful early stage co-finance VCs 
demonstrate attraction of specialist 
market for private VC and spin-out 
new fund managers 
A greater number of Cleantechs with 
disruptive green innovation reach 
commercialisation and international 
scale-up quicker, impacting on 
reducing CO2 and increasing 
renewable energy. 
Sustainable firms, job creation, supply 
chain multipliers, global sales.  
Recycling of entrepreneurial wealth 
and IP – ‘virtuous cycle’ 
Cleantech innovation, Climate Change mitigation and economic growth (proposition 6) 
Cleantech innovation, Climate Change mitigation and economic growth (proposition 6) form the fundamental raison 
d’etre for the UK government’s co-finance UKIIF programme (Owen et al, 2018). All benefit from reduced 
transaction costs through the complementarity approach of UKIIF. Successful optimised investment exits generate 
returns of funds as well as a range of economic multipliers which are shown to benefit the UK exchequer, notably 
because these businesses are keeping a major presence in the UK, even after international trade sales and PE 
investments. Furthermore, there is evidence of Lerner’s (2010) recycling and the virtuous cycle of entrepreneurial 
VC ecosystem development (Owen and Mason, 2019) through fund manager development, increased early stage 
Cleantech VC financing and serial entrepreneurship and investment activities of former UKIIF portfolio venture 
managers. However, serious questions remain about how early stage cleantech innovation is selected for co-finance 
programme investment and evaluated (Owen et al, 2018). Greater consideration is required for the measurement of 
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full socio-environmental impacts, including circular economy longevity and recycling aspects, of investments. In this 
respect perhaps the most crucial requirement is for improved metrics to assess green outcomes and assist government 
policymakers in their efforts to rebalance the operation of the private VC market and its institutional investors to 
encourage increased early stage green innovation SME investment.    
Conclusions 
The paper has demonstrated a clear way forward for a Green New Deal policy to address the financing gaps facing 
early stage innovative cleantech SMEs that can provide game changing low carbon impacts to tackle Climate Change. 
The adoption of a novel resource complementarity research framework to assess the interrelated positions and 
requirements of policymakers, VC financiers and early stage innovative Cleantech ventures, demonstrates the 
catalytic value of government co-finance programmes like UKIIF, when they have sufficient international vision and 
funding scale.  
Whilst the study is limited to the examination of UKIIF, a UK government and EIF co-financed VC programme, 
it has demonstrated through 7 case studies how such a targeted early stage Cleantech fund can make a difference. 
This has occurred both in terms of transition to a lower carbon economy through a variety of Cleantech innovations 
impacting on sectors relating to renewable energy, advanced manufacturing and recycling, and also wider economic 
benefits. These are clearly articulated through the research framework and relate to sustainable ventures, high quality 
job generation and financial return to the economy through UKIIF’s investment returns to the British Business Bank 
within a nine year period, substantial sales revenues and tax returns to the exchequer, supply chain multipliers and 
recycling of CEO investment and time through serial entrepreneurship.  
An important observation is the retention of investee firms and employment in the UK, even in cases where there 
has been considerable international investment, although a cautionary tale surrounds case E which has outsourced 
manufacturing and several hundred jobs to Eastern Europe. This appears particularly pertinent, given the swathe of 
multinational company job losses taking place during the Brexit period. 
In conclusion, our emerging theoretical framework offers the opportunity for further studies, through 
demonstrating considerable savings in transaction costs and major socio-economic and environmental outcomes. 
However, it also highlights the need for considerably more work in developing appropriate metrics and tools to assist 
in the selection and evaluation of investee ventures.    
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